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By Elliot Chau
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Summary
The United States experiences mass shootings which cause the American public to
respond in various ways. One measurable aspect is the demand for firearms following a shooting.
Using the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s National Instant Criminal Background Check
System to proxy firearm sales, I create an ARMA model that estimates which characteristic of a
mass shooting dictates the largest firearms purchase response. I find that President Obama’s
tenure caused 210,000 more firearms sales per month. I also find that if the mass shooter was an
internationally influenced terrorist, firearms sales increased by about 420,000 for the two-month
period.

I would like to thank Robert Baumann and Victor Matheson for their guidance and
assistance throughout this project. I would also like to thank Jurgen Brauer for his expertise and
feedback on the nuances of the methodology.
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I. Introduction
On June 14, 2017, many Americans woke up to the news that four people, including a
Republican congressman, were shot while practicing for the Congressional Baseball Game for
Charity. Members of both parties quickly denounced the politically motivated violence, and the
Governor of Virginia, Terry McAuliffe, among other Democrats, called for tighter firearm
control measures.
There is a paradoxical nature of mass shootings, gun regulation rhetoric, and firearm
sales. Throughout the Obama and Trump administrations, there has been a recurring sequence of
events: (1) a mass shooting occurs, (2) politicians (usually Democrats) call for an increase in gun
control measures, and (3) gun sales surge. This trend has been noticed by investors. Following
the 2017 Las Vegas shooting, stock prices for firearm manufacturers Ruger and Smith & Wesson
temporarily jumped. To investors and gun owners, mass shootings create concern that weapons
will be more difficult to acquire, which encourages gun sales after the event.
The New York Times released an interactive graph illustrating this trend in June 2016.
After a mass shooting or a political call for increased gun control, a spike in the number of guns
sold would soon follow. For example, the graphic, adjusted for seasonality, shows a blip
following President Obama’s election and the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting (Figure
1.1). This circumstantial evidence suggests a positive correlation between mass shootings and
demand for guns.
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Figure 1.1. The New York Times graphic illustrating a correlation between keystone events and
gun sales. Graph updated to June 2016.

This paper analyzes the change in the number of background checks in relation to notable
mass shootings. Following a mass shooting, the basic facts emerge: the quantity of people killed,
the quantity of people injured, the political response, and the perpetrator’s motive. These
quantifiable factors are used as controls to determine whether they impact gun sales. I find that
mass shootings, internationally associated terrorists, and Obama’s tenure are the most influential
forces behind surges in gun sales.
II. Literature Review
Unfortunately, literature on this topic is sparse. American gun advocacy organizations
successfully lobbied legislators to include a big provision in a 1996 spending bill. The provision,
called the Dickey Amendment, prevented the Center for Disease and Control from using federal
dollars to fund gun violence related research. As a result, there is minimal publicly-funded
evidence.
There are, however, several empirical papers and medical research articles that
investigate some facet of the legal, financial, political, and public health effects. Luca et al.
(2016) finds a high impact of mass shootings on proposed gun policies, depending on the
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political party in control of the state legislature. Overall, one mass shooting increases the number
of firearm bills by 15%. For Republican-controlled legislatures, the number of enacted laws
increase by 75% after a mass shooting with the intent of loosening gun restrictions. Gopal and
Greenwood (2017) investigate the relationship between mass shootings and stock prices of the
two publicly traded firearm companies, Ruger and Smith & Wesson. They find an unclear
conclusion. In the short term, there is an increase in demand which should increase the stock
price. However, in the long term, the business model is called into question which should
decrease the stock price. Depetris-Chauvin (2015) focuses on a potential 2008 Obama presidency
and gun sales. This study utilizes data from a futures market on the outcome of the election and
the corresponding number of background checks for gun purchases. It finds a large “Obama
effect,” where an unusual increase in the demand for guns was driven by fears of then Presidentelect Obama’s gun-control policy. Finally, Barry et al. (2013) and Kellerman and Rivara (2013)
examine the issue through a public health lens. They illustrate several scenarios where various
levels of government actively prevent research on gun violence and public health.
III. Data
i) Gun sales
Gun sales data can only be estimated through a proxy, as there are no public gun sales
data either at the state or federal level. Following the passage of the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act of 1993, with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) implementing the system
in 1998, every transaction at a gun store requires a background check. This request is called the
National Instant Background Check System (henceforth, NICS). Every NICS request implies
that an attempt to buy at least one gun. This proxy, however, is an imperfect measure of gun
sales because an individual could purchase multiple guns in one transaction, or their transaction
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could be denied due to legal prevention of ownership. Brauer (2013) created a survey asking gun
salesmen the typical number of firearms sold during a transaction and finds that every
background check averages 1.1 firearm sales (110 sales/100 checks). This suggests that NICS
slightly underestimates the number of firearms sold at stores.
In addition to the traditional retail method of purchasing guns, there are methods to
circumvent NICS. For example, there are exemptions for concealed carry permit holders in
addition to the so-called “gun show loophole.” In some states, a Concealed Pistol License 1 holder
can substitute the weapons license for a background check. This is known as the Brady
exemption. The logic is that those who have acquired the license have already passed a
background check, making additional checks redundant. Commercial weapons dealers must have
a Federal Firearms License (FFL) in order to participate in intrastate and interstate commerce.
The “gun show loophole,” however, allows an individual without a FFL to exchange a gun
without going through NICS for a private party sale. The law says that if the seller possesses a
FFL, they must conduct a background check; but, the law does not state the need for a check if
they do not have a FFL. The amount and proportion of private sales in relation to total sales is
unknown.
In the meantime, NICS is the best publicly available indicator of gun sales in the country.
Intuition would suggest that the estimate provided by NICS is low—it is more likely for an
individual to purchase multiple guns compared to the number of denied background checks. In
2016, the FBI denied approximately 100,000 checks out of an average of 14 million background
checks completed—a relatively small amount.

Each states’ labeling of the practice varies. Other names include Concealed Carry Weapon
License, License To Carry, and Concealed Handgun License.
1

6

ii) Defining controls
There are several controls in the estimation. First, there are dummy variables that
characterize the event: domestic terrorism, international terrorism, mass shooting, calls for gun
control, and mental health of the perpetrator. See Table 3.1 for characteristics of the event.
Second, there are variables that capture the severity of the event, specifically the quantity of
fatalities and the quantity of injuries. Third, there is a trend to account for the general increase in
background checks since December 1998. Fourth, the unemployment rate captures the economic
conditions of the country. The hypothesis is that people anticipate higher crime during an
economic downturn, therefore leading to more weapon purchases for personal protection.
Dummy Variable Terms

Definition

Inspired by or associated with Americanbased movements that espouse extremist
Domestic terrorism
ideologies of a political, religious, racial, or
environmental nature (e.g. anti-government
views, racial supremacy).
Inspired by or associated with designated
International terrorism
foreign organizations or nations (e.g. ISIL, alQaeda).
No official consensus. FBI defined mass
murderer if 4 or more killed in an event.
Mass shooting
Commonly accepted and used derived
definition would be 4 or more shot in one
incident.
A presidential call for gun control
immediately following the event; “official”
Call for control/Obama
address of the incident. President Obama is
the only president that has called for controls
following an incident.
Perpetrator has a history of mental health
Mental health
problems, checking-in to mental health
facilities, or plea of insanity in court.
Table 3.1. Terrorism definitions provided by the FBI.
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iii) List of events
Using the definitions in Table 3.1., the daunting reality is that a mass shooting occurs in
America nearly every day2. With only monthly data on background checks, I restricted the
number of mass shooting events to those that are “nationally recognized.” These events are
particularly gruesome, usually involving high levels of fatalities or injuries, or an attack on a
defenseless population such as church-goers or children. I only consider events directly
addressed at the presidential level ranging from a press conference to Twitter tweets. These
salient events usually reignite the conversation about American society’s cultural values and
priorities. The list of events is presented on Table 3.2.
Event
Columbine High School
shooting
Virginia Tech shooting
Election victory of presidentelect Barack Obama
Tucson shooting (Rep. Gabby
Giffords incident)
Aurora movie theater shooting
Sandy Hook Elementary
School shooting
African Methodist Episcopal
Church shooting
Planned Parenthood shooting
San Bernardino shooting
Orlando nightclub shooting
Dallas police shooting
Congressional baseball practice
shooting
Las Vegas strip shooting

Location

Date

Columbine, CO

April 20, 1999

Blacksburg, VA

April 16, 2007

National

November 4, 2008

Tucson, AZ

January 8, 2011

Aurora, CO

July 20, 2012

Newtown, CT

December 14, 2012

Charleston, SC

June 17, 2015

Colorado Springs, CO
San Bernardino, CA
Orlando, FL
Dallas, TX

November 27, 2015
December 2, 2015
June 12, 2016
July 7, 2016

Alexandria, VA

June 14, 2017

Las Vegas, NV

October 1, 2017

2

The Gun Violence Archive tracks mass shootings that occur every day across the United States
that fit the definition.
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Sutherland Springs church
shooting
Stoneman Douglas High
School shooting

Sutherland Springs, TX

November 5, 2017

Parkland, FL

February 14, 2018

Table 3.2.
IV. Methodology
i) Data cleaning and adjustments
When a mass shooting occurs, a dummy can be marked for the following variables:
dterror, iterror, and mentalhealth. There are two incidents where none of these variables are
marked: Las Vegas and Columbine. Otherwise, these categories are treated as mutually
exclusive. For example, if the perpetrator had mental health issues, neither dterror or iterror are
marked. A tree diagram illustration is as follows:

massshooting

dterror

iterror

mentalhealth

none

I also use the quantity of fatalities and injuries as independent variables in order to test
whether the severity of the mass shooting impacts gun sales.
The FBI only publishes the number of monthly background checks, and this coarse data
imposes several limitations. First, there is a time lag in observing the response to the event. In
conjunction with the monthly data points, it is difficult to determine the approximate event
response time. To account for this, each event is marked for two months to capture precipitating
effects. For example, the Tuscon shooting occurred in January of 2009, and the relevant dummy
variables are marked for both January 2009 and February 2009.
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There are several instances where two mass shootings occur within three months, causing
a monthly overlap when capturing precipitating effects. For example, the Las Vegas and
Sutherland Springs shootings happened during October and November of 2017, respectively. For
these events, the middle month (November, in this case) will have dummies marked in more than
one of the mass shooting categories. Additionally, that month will also have the sum of the
quantity of fatalities and the quantity of injuries from both events.
The call for control dummy variable can alternatively be viewed as an Obama dummy
variable. While gun control is a common agenda for the Democratic Party, President Obama has
repeatedly called for stronger regulations not only following mass shootings, but during the
annual State of the Union speeches, town hall meetings, debates, interviews, and other public
appearances. This indicates that the call for control is not limited to mass shooting events, but it
is a common theme throughout his entire time in office. Therefore, a call for control is marked
throughout his tenure. It is unmarked for all other presidents since 1998.
V. Econometric Analysis
i) ARMA Model
Firearm sales illustrate time series behavior due to seasonality. There is high demand
every year during the fall and winter hunting season. As a result, it would be appropriate to use
an ARMA model. Trended Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests reject the null hypothesis,
indicating that the series does not have a unit root. The optimal number of lags is determined by
the lowest Akaike Information Criterion. To estimate the number of background checks based on
the defined variables and controls previously listed, the following ARMA(P,Q) model is
presented:
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checkst =  + ∑𝑃𝑝=1  𝑝*checkst-p + ∑𝑄𝑞=1 𝑞*t-q +
*trendt + *unemploymentt + *callcontrolt +
1*massshootingt +
1*dterrort + 2*iterrort +
1*mentalhealtht +
1*qfatalitiest + 2*qinjuriest + t
In this estimation, P is the number of lags for checkst or the autoregressive (AR) element
of the model, and Q is the number of lags for t or the moving average (MA) element of the
model. The unemployment variable is the monthly percentage of unemployment intended to
capture economic conditions. The following are dummy variables: callcontrol, dterror, iterror,
massshootings, and mentalhealth. Definitions for these abbreviations can be found in Table 3.1.
The variables qfatalities and qinjuries measure the quantity of fatalities and the quantity of
injuries, respectively, in order to account for the severity of the event.
ii) ARMA Results
Running various ARMA models, Model 1 is the exogenous, baseline model that captures
the positive conditions of the country such as the increase in guns over time, the unemployment
rate, and the Obama presidency. Model 2 considers the motive of each incident: did the
perpetrator have a terrorism motive? If so, what was the source of inspiration? Model 3
determines the effect of the perpetrator’s mental health on gun sales because many politicians
have claimed that mental health is a significant reason for mass shootings, particularly President
Trump. Model 4 measures the response based on the severity of the event. Model 5 evaluates all
the independent variables together.
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Model 1

Model 2
(Motive)

Call for
control/Obama

7 011***
(2 123)
-2 997
(37 510)
192 749
(117 784)

Mass shooting

-

6 791***
(1 937)
-12 247
(33 030)
181 140**
(90 852)
63 726**
(29 301)
29 172
(48 945)
385 555***
(34 193)

NICS
Trend
Unemployment

Domestic
terrorism
International
terrorism
Mental health
Quantity of
fatalities
Quantity of
injuries

-

-

Model 3
(Mental
health)
6 734***
(1 842)
-14 214
(37 290)
207 526*
(121 294)
-66
(48 772)

Model 4
(Severity)

Model 5

6 717***
(1 847)
-17 007
(32 329)
229 444*
(118 840)
-81 577**
(35 312)

-

-

-

-

154 535***
(53 742)

-

6 580***
(1 983)
-16 458
(29 664)
209 229**
(89 817)
-164 077***
(42 819)
182 679***
(50 128)
383 465***
(60 453)
193 697**
(95 063)
6 040*
(3 586)
-340
(419)

13 077***
(1 458)
-1 180***
(211)
Table 5.2. OPG standard errors in parentheses.
-

-

-

0.834***
0.864***
0.894***
0.918***
(0.066)
(0.072)
(0.067)
(0.074)
-0.061
-0.148
-0.160*
-0.13
AR(2)
(0.106)
(0.102)
(0.094)
(0.116)
0.048
0.066
0.069
0.064
AR(14)
(0.075)
(0.076)
(0.077)
(0.084)
Standard errors in parentheses.
(1) Monthly dummies are included in each model but omitted from Table 5.2 for brevity. Full
results are available upon request.
(2) * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
(3) All AR coefficients fall between -1 and 1.
(4) For brevity, only AR(1), AR(2), and AR(14) are shown. Actual computations run from AR(1)
through AR(14). Full output is available upon request.
AR(1)

0.909***
(0.060)
-0.232**
(0.091)
0.098
(0.071)

Table 5.2 presents the results of several ARMA models. First, across all models,
unemployment was insignificant. This suggests the rejection of the initial hypothesis that relates
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unemployment and the number of firearms sold. Second, Obama’s tenure had a large impact on
weapon sales. In Model 5, each month of his presidency caused an average increase of about
210,000 more background checks.
Based on the tree diagram in the methodology, the mass shooting factor must be attached
to another variable. The mass shooting variable carries a negative sign, and it is often combined
with domestic terrorism, international terrorism, or mental health, therefore resulting in a net
positive value. As previously mentioned, Las Vegas and Columbine are the only two shootings
that do not follow this pattern. If the perpetrator is a terrorist, where that influence comes from
has a differential effect. If the shooter’s motive came domestically from fringe, American-based
movements, there is approximately a 183,000 increase. If the motive came from overseas,
however, the reaction to purchase firearms is more than twice as large with a 383,000 increase.
This could imply that firearms owners are very sensitive, and they have a particular fear of
foreign ideologies influencing people inside the United States.
The model also indicates that mental health of the perpetrator contributes to firearms
purchases. The significance of mental health suggests that these individuals’ actions cause
concern among those who choose to purchase firearms. It may not be the fact that they
conducted a shooting, but it suggests that purchasing firearms are a counterbalance to the
perceived threat.
Moving from Model 4 to Model 5, the quantity of fatalities and injuries become less
significant, indicating that the severity of the event is overshadowed by the simple fact that the
event occurred. A “correction” factor may be an explanation for the negative sign for those who
are only injured in a shooting.
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VI. Conclusion
Using monthly FBI NICS data, I estimate an ARMA model controlling for several
exogenous factors. I find that President Obama’s tenure, mental health of the perpetrator, and
internationally-influenced terrorists significantly contribute to an increase in sales; the increase
ranges from several thousand to several hundred thousand background checks in the time period
following the event. The country’s economic health, captured by the unemployment rate, is
statistically insignificant in all models. The severity of the event varied in significance,
depending on the model used.
The results of this study suggest several conclusions. First, mass shootings increase
firearm sales, but the overall increase is dependent on who commits these shootings. If it was
conducted by a domestic terrorist, the results show that there would be a modest increase in the
number of background checks. If it was an internationally-influenced terrorist, background
checks surge by at least 200,000, such as in the aftermaths of the San Bernardino and the
Orlando mass shootings. Second, among long-time firearm owners or first-time purchasers, there
was a particular fear of President Obama’s ideology. Though there was no notable firearmrelated legislation at the federal level during his tenure, his calls for gun control instilled
uncertainty of the future availability of firearms. This caused a large reactionary increase in
sales. Third, there is a fear of internationally influenced terrorists conducting mass shootings in
the United States. Ideologies perpetuated by ISIS and other organizations have arrived stateside,
and a lack of perceived ability to contain the scope of this new threat also creates uncertainty.
This is less like domestic terrorism where common motives like racial extremism and antigovernment views have been well documented and experienced in American history.
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